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We tested the validity of the “Law of Increasing State Activities” or Wagner’s Law using time 
series for the U.S. state-local government (SLG) real expenditure over the period 1957-2006. This 
period was characterized by rising SLG total expenditure and several of its sub-categories both in 
absolute terms and relative to state personal income. Cointegration tests of Johansen (1991) and 
Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001) yielded results suggesting that, with the exception of insurance 
trust benefits (ins) and social services and income maintenance (ssim) ratios, no other 
nonstationary expenditure sub-category was cointegrated with state real per capita personal 
income (pcpi) and error-corrected over time. Both ins and ssim were found to be income elastic.  
The Toda-Yamamoto (1995) methodology that allows for estimating level relationships without 
pre-testing for unit roots further suggested that ins and ssim were driven by pcpi consistent with a 
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I. Introduction 
 
  The “Law of Increasing State Activities” enunciated by the German social scientist 
Adolph Wagner (1893) is one of the earliest hypotheses of the growth of the relative size of the 
public sector. Generally speaking, Wagner’s Law focuses on the nexus between the size of the 
economy and the size of the public-sector provided goods and services and postulates that the 
latter grows at a faster pace than the former during the process of industrialization and 
urbanization. This reflects the increasing expansion of government activities that complement or 
substitute for private activities.  Specifically, Wagner attributed the growth of the public sector to 
higher expenditures in areas such as enforcing contracts and regulatory activities (necessitated by 
a higher demand for government intervention in an economy with new layers of externalities and 
interdependencies), income elastic “cultural and welfare” programs, and public long-term 
investment and infrastructure projects as well as managing and financing natural monopolies (see, 
for example, Bird, 1971 and Payne et al., 2006).  Based on a more careful reading of Wagner’s 
original writings, Peacock and Scott (2000) and Peacock (2006) maintain that Wagner’s 
definition of “state activities” should include those related to public utilities and enterprises, 
public provision of health and educational services and a social system of security to protect the 
(working) population against adverse social consequences of economic transformation.  
  Many of the activities noted by Wagner have been incorporated into modern theories of 
the public sector activity.  Examples include government interventions to correct externalities (the 
Neoclassical School), public redistributive expenditures in response to increased demand by the 
“median voter” for such expenditures (the Public Choice School) and countercyclical government 
spending (the Keynesian School).  However, the evidence supporting the “law” as a frequently 
observed empirical phenomenon is less than robust.  The validity of Wagner’s Law has been 
typically tested based on whether the income (output) elasticity of a measure of government 
expenditure is statistically significant and greater than one.  To this end, a large number of past 
studies used data from one or a cross-section of countries and employed simple regression   3
analysis and/or standard Granger causality tests to draw conclusions about the elasticity 
coefficient and the direction of causality in the income-public expenditure nexus.
1 The evidence 
from such studies may be questionable for the following reasons: Firstly, Wagner’s Law focuses 
on the long-term relationship between the size of the public sector and the size of economy 
(income/output) in the process of economic growth and development in an individual country (or 
unit of analysis).  Thus, multi-country samples typically spanning about three decades may not be 
long-enough for testing such a relationship. Secondly, it may not be appropriate to pool countries 
that have a number of social, political and institutional dissimilarities.  Thirdly, it is well known 
that standard regression results may be spurious if the variables employed are nonstationary in 
levels (Granger and Newbold, 1974).  Moreover, if the nonstationary variables are cointegrated, 
then they have an error-correction representation (Engle and Granger, 1987) requiring the 
inclusion of an error-correction term into the causality analysis.   
  With the above points in mind, we investigate the relationship between public 
expenditure and income using annual observations on the U.S. state-local level of government 
(SLG). The sample period covers about half-a-century (1957-2006) which may better allow the 
emergence of a long-term relationship, if any.  Moreover, we go beyond the empirical analysis of 
total government expenditures (as in Islam, 2001) and test the validity of Wagner’s Law for 
various expenditure sub-categories. This feature of our analysis is important in view of the fact 
that (a) many of the activities of the public sector emphasized by Wagner fall within the realm of 
SLG responsibilities, (b) various sub-categories of SLG total expenditure have grown at different 
rates over time and (c) SLG expenditure sub-categories cannot grow much faster than state 
income or fiscal capacity without creating serious financial stress for sub-national governments 
whose ability to borrow and run deficits is constrained by balanced budget rules.  To our 
knowledge, there are only a few studies that examined the validity of Wagner’s Law using the 
                                                 
1 The literature on country-level studies is voluminous.  For a summary some of major studies see, for 
example, Peacock and Scott (2000) and Payne et al. (2006). 
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U.S. sub-national government data.  However, all of these studies specified models that were 
estimated using the OLS technique without pre-testing the level variables for stationarity.
2  
  In Section II of what follows, we briefly describe our data and examine changes in the 
level and composition of SLG expenditure.  In Section III, we first specify the empirical model 
corresponding to the version of Wagner’s Law tested in this paper. We then explain the empirical 
methodology and discuss the results. The methodology emphasizes the questions of cointegration 
and causality between SLG expenditure and income. In addition to standard tests, we employ the 
bounds testing of cointegration proposed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2001) and an estimation 
approach to drawing Granger non-causality inferences proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
to shed light on these questions. These time-series techniques are particularly helpful when the 
order of integration of the series cannot be conclusively determined based on the results of 
alternative unit root tests.  The final section summarizes our findings and notes their implications 
for the federal relief funds to fiscally stressed sub-national governments. 
 II. Data: The level and composition of U.S. state-local expenditure  
   Our data set consists of annual observations on the U.S. SLG total expenditure and eight 
of its major sub-categories (source: State and local Government Finances, U.S. Census Bureau) 
and aggregate state personal income (source: Regional Economic Accounts, U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis) over the period 1957-2006.  The time series for the expenditure and personal 
income variables at this intermediate level of aggregation were deflated using the price indexes 
                                                 
2 Yousefi and Abizadeh (1992) used time series for thirty randomly selected states (1950-85) and a 
multivariate model. They found income elasticity estimates consistent with Wagner’s Law for twenty-one 
states.  Eberts and Gronberg (1992) employed the share in state output of total government spending as 
well as several of its sub-categories (1964-86). Controlling for the sectoral composition of state output and 
state age, they found statistically significant and negative per capita output elasticity of the share variables 
in pooled data which refuted Wagner’s Law.  However, they also reported supporting evidence in relation 
to “protective services” (in eight states) and “public welfare” (in fifteen states) when individual state time-
series data were used instead.  Grand (1998) studied fifty states (1945-1984) and regressed the share of 
state spending in total state output on lagged levels of state personal income and state population.  His 
results supported Wagner’s Law in only nine states.  See Henrekson (1993) for a criticism of using of 
possibly nonstationary level variables in level equations in this context. 
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for total state and local government consumption and gross investment expenditure and U.S. GDP 
(2000=100), respectively (source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 3.9.4).
3 The use of 
separate price indexes allows for differential changes in the prices of goods and services 
purchased by the SLGs versus those that are included in a larger basket that constitutes GDP. 
  Table 1 summarizes the changes in real SLG total expenditure and its major sub-
categories as well as real aggregate state personal income over the period 1957-2006.  Several 
observations can be made based on the table.  Firstly, real total SLG expenditure increased at an 
average annual rate of 3.56 percent during this period which is only slightly higher than the 
corresponding 3.38 percent growth rate of real state personal income. This fairly small growth 
rate differential, however, translated into roughly 1.7 percent increase in the ratio of SLG total 
expenditure to personal income during the fifty years of the sample. Secondly, the expenditure 
sub-categories exhibited three distinct patterns of change: (a) highway expenditure grew at a rate 
well below those of real total expenditure and real state personal income. As a result, it lost in 
terms of its shares of total expenditure and income.  (b) Police and fire protection, education, and 
utility were among the sub-categories that grew at rates roughly equal to the growth rates of total 
spending and income. This explains their remarkably stable expenditure and income shares 
during the sample period. (c) Increases in insurance trust benefits (especially its employment 
retirement component), social services and income maintenance (especially its public welfare 
component), interest on general debt, and financial administration and general control 
expenditure sub-categories significantly outpaced increases in total expenditure and personal 
income. As a consequence, these sub-categories gained shares.
4  
                                                 
3 The choice of the sample period and the variables were based on data availability on a consistent basis. In 
this connection, note that gross state product (GSP) that one might have preferred to state personal income 
was available based on a methodology and industrial classification that changed after 1997. 
 
4  Daly (2003) pointed out that states have a tendency to rapidly expand funding to various programs during 
economic booms and, in so doing, sharply depart from standard spending rules of constant real spending 
relative to income or constant real spending on a per capita basis. As noted above, in the longer-term, this 
departure is more pronounced in relation to only a few sub-categories.     6
These observations may be interpreted as prima facie evidence in favor Wagner’s Law in 
relation to SLG total expenditure and some of its sub-categories. The patterns noted above also 
suggest that formal analyses Wagner’s Law may be more informative if they cover various types 
of public expenditure.  
 III. Empirical Methodology and Results 
  Since Wagner emphasized the growth of the public sector in a relative sense, we choose 

















 ln ln              ( 1 )  
where ln denotes the natural logarithm, G represents a measure of government expenditure, Y is 
a measure of the size of the (private) economy, P is the size of population, and   is a white noise 
error term.  Note that if the elasticity coefficient  is positive and statistically significant, then we 
have statistical evidence consistent with Wagner’s Law.
6 For the purpose of our analysis, we use 
SLG real total expenditure and its major sub-categories as alternative measures of public 
expenditure and real aggregate state personal income (PI) a proxy for the size of the economy 
(see Table 1). Next, we estimate the following long-term relationship for the combined SLG unit 
in year t: 
 ln( t j t j j t j pcpi g , ) ln( )                  ( 2 )  
where,   is the jth real expenditure sub-category scaled by real personal income and pcpi is  
real per capita personal income. Note that while parsimonious, the model incorporates the effects 
of changes in population, price level, and the size of the economy on SLG expenditure.   
j g
                                                 
5 There are a number of other proposed bivariate specifications that employ various combinations of the 
expenditure and income variables expressed in level terms, or scaled by population and/or output.  See, for 
example, Peacock and Scott (2000) and Payne et al. (2006).  
 
6 Equation (1) can be rewritten to express all the variables in level terms. Then, it can be easily shown that 
the elasticity coefficient E=      1 ln / ln Y G .  If >0, then E >1 which means that the percentage 
change in the level of government spending is larger than the percentage change in the level of income.   7
  Since it is generally understood that Wagner’s Law is most relevant to economies in the 
early stages of economic development (Peacock and Scott, 2000), the sole focus on estimating the 
income elasticity coefficient in relation to mature economies may be somewhat misplaced.  A 
particularly important and relevant empirical question that we focus on in this paper is whether 
the government expenditure and income variables are cointegrated in such economies.
7  If so, 
they do not drift too far apart over time even if their levels are nonstationary; for the two 
cointegrated variables have an error-correction representation (Engle and Granger, 1987).  Thus, 
a shock to a variable that causes it to deviate from the long-term equilibrium (or cointegrating) 
relationship will be corrected over time so that the equilibrium relationship is restored.  The 
existence of a cointegrating relationship and an error-correction mechanism is particularly 
important to explore in the case of SLG expenditure sub-categories such as insurance trust 
benefits, social services and income maintenance and interest on debt whose high growth rates , 
even on an inflation adjusted basis, have raised public concerns.  Fortunately, the questions of 
elasticity and cointegration can be both investigated within the framework of an error-correction 
model (EMC).  
   For the jth spending category in year t, the ECM may be written as follows: 
t j t j t j j i t
p
i
i j i t j
p
i










(3)   
  According to Equation (3), short-term changes in   reflect an adjustment to deviations 
from its long-term (cointegrating) relationship with pcpi.  The magnitude of this adjustment in 
each period is given by the error-correction coefficient . Therefore, contrary to Peacock and 
                                                 
7 In this connection, Peacock and Scott (2000, p.10) contended that: “Interestingly, the cointegration 
approach, which attempts to identify a long-term connection among variables which may not be apparent in 
a multiple regression test, could be regarded as consistent with Wagner’s view that there was not 
necessarily a cause and effect relationship between economic development and government activity; this is 
because the existence of cointegration does not imply causality.” They also suggested that “Wagner’s 
writings imply that he would have been satisfied with cointegration.” We will return to the issue of the link 
between cointegration and causality later in this section.   8
Scott’s (2000) claim, cointegration between  and pcpi does imply causality in at least one 
direction (Engle and Granger, 1987). A statistically significant and negative value of
j g
j  is taken 
as evidence of a causal relationship running from pcpi to . A similar inference can be made 
regarding causality from   to pcpi based on the error-correction term in a model with pcpi as 
the dependent variable.  
j g
j g
  We first use the maximum likelihood approach of Johansen and Juselius (1990) and 
Johansen (1991) to determine whether  and pcpi are cointegrated and then estimate the 
cointegrating vector, if any.  This approach requires pre-testing of the variables in order to 
determine whether they are first-differenced stationary, or integrated of order one (I(1)).  
j g
a. Unit root tests  
  We examine the time series property of each variable using the ADF (Dickey and Fuller, 
1979), PP (Phillips and Perron, 1988), and KPSS (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin, 
1992) unit root tests.  While the null hypothesis of the ADF and PP tests is that the variable in 
question has a unit root or is nonstationary in level, the KPPS test has the null of stationary level. 
Our unit root test results are considered robust if we can reject the null hypothesis in the ADF and 
PP tests and fail to reject it in the KPPS test.  
  Table 2 presents the results of the unit root tests.  For each variable, the tests were carried 
out with a constant term (C) and with and without a trend variable (T) in the test equation.  As 
can be seen, there is some evidence of nonstationarity of the level of all the variables with the 
exception of total expenditure (te).  Note the KPPS test results contradict the finding of the 
existence of a unit root based on the ADF and PP tests in some cases.  In these cases, we refer to 
our test results as inconclusive.  Further tests indicated that all the variables became stationary 
after first-differencing (results are not shown).  
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b. Cointegration tests  
  We now proceed to perform the cointegration tests given that, except for the total 
expenditure variable (te), there is some evidence of level nonsationarity and first-differenced 
stationarity for all the variables.  Table 2 summarizes the cointegration rank test results using the 
procedure suggested by Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Johansen (1991).
8 According to both 
the trace and maximum eigenvalue test statistics the null hypothesis of no cointegrating 
relationship (r=0) between expenditure and pcpi can be rejected in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis of at most one cointegrating relationship (r≤1) only for the insurance trust benefits 
(ins) and the social services and income maintenance (ssim) variables.  Furthermore, the 
estimated coefficients of pcpi in the cointegrating equations for ins and ssim are positive (0.425 
and 0.169, respectively) and significant. This implies that the corresponding expenditure levels 
are income elastic as hypothesized by Wagner (see footnote 5). The results of our formal 
statistical analysis are, thus, consistent with Wagner’s Law and corroborate the informal evidence 
presented in Table 1 for these two sub-categories.
9  
Having tested for cointegration, we turn to the question of the direction of short-term 
causality based on the estimated error-correction coefficient ( ). As can be seen,  has the 
correct negative sign and is statistically significant for both ins and ssim.  Its magnitude indicates 
the fraction the deviation of each variable from its long-term relationship with pcpi that is 
corrected each year (0.433 and 0.180, respectively).  Since the error-correction terms in similar 
ECMs with pcpi as the dependent variable was statistically insignificant (results are not shown 
                                                 
8 Since tests results are sensitive to specification of the cointegrating equation, we compared different 
models based on the Schwarz information criterion.  In all cases, the model with an intercept term only was 
selected over the model including both intercept and trend terms. 
 
9  A somewhat different interpretation of the ssim result is to suggest that an increase in pcpi increases 
public spending on social welfare programs, because it represents a higher level of state fiscal capacity 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2004). Also note that the ssim result is consistent with 
Eberts and Gronberg’s (1992) finding in relation to “public welfare” expenditure noted earlier.     10
here) the causality implication is that pcpi drives both ins and ssim, but the reverse does not hold 
true. 
  An alternative approach to cointegration is the “bounds testing” in the context of an 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001). The advantage 
of this approach is that it does not require pre-testing of the variables to establish the order of 
integration.  For this reason, it can be used to examine the existence of a level relationship 
irrespective of whether the variables of interest are purely I(0) or purely I(1).  This is an important 
advantage in view of the well-known problem of the low power of the unit root tests in small 
samples and the fact that the results obtained from alternative unit root tests do not always agree. 
The ARDL estimated in this approach is essentially an unrestricted ECM which for the jth 
expenditure variable is specified as follows: 
t j t j t j j i t
m
i
i j i t j
m
i
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      (4) 
Equation (4) is estimated using OLS and the joint hypothesis of  1 , j  =  2 , j  = 0 is then tested 
using an F-test (or a Wald test). The rejection of the null is taken as evidence in favor of a 
cointegrating relationship. Since the asymptotic distribution of the F-statistic is non-standard 
under the null hypothesis and the variables can be either I(0) or I(1), Pesaran et al. (2001) provide 
two sets of asymptotic critical values (associated with different number of variables in the 
cointegrating space) and use them as critical value bounds for testing.   
More specifically, the critical value with all the variables assumed to be purely I(0) 
constitutes the lower bound (CVL) and that associated with all the variables assumed to be purely 
I(1) the upper bound (CVU).  If the computed F-statistic> CVU, then the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration is rejected.  If the F-statistic<CVU, then the null hypothesis of no cointegation can 
not be rejected.  Finally, if CVU<F-statistic<CVU, then the test result is inconclusive.    11
  Table 4 summarizes the bounds test results.
10 As before, we find evidence of 
cointegration only in the case of ins and ssim variables.  For other expenditure variables, the test 
results are either inconclusive (te, fagc and pf), or they reject cointegration (ed, ins, int, hy, and 
ut).  Thus, the bounds cointegration test results confirm our earlier conclusions based on Table 3.   
c. Toda-Yamamoto non-causality tests 
  If one interprets Wagner’s Law as suggesting that the process of economic growth and 
development necessitates the expansion of the public sector, then there is an implication a causal 
effect running from the level of (per capita) income to government spending. On the other hand, 
within the Keynesian framework causality may run in the opposite direction.
11  
As we have before, the ECM provided some evidence of causality from pcpi to ins and ssim.  
For the sake of completeness, we proceed to conduct further causality tests employing a 
methodology suggested by Toda and Yamamoto (1995). Here, unlike standard Granger causality 
tests, a level VAR is specified and estimated without having to pre-test the variables for the 
degree of integration and/or cointegration rank(s). This approach has been employed to make 
inferences regarding long-term causality among variables in a level relationship like Equation 
(2).
12 The steps in Toda-Yamamoto (T-Y) procedure are briefly described below: 
                                                 
10 The bounds are valid if the residuals are serially uncorrelated. Thus, the lag orders in Equation (3) must 
be sufficiently long to ensure that is the case. On the other hand, the specified model should be 
parsimonious. Given these two important considerations, we first chose the optimal lag lengths using  the 
Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBC) and then tested the residuals for serial correlation using the 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test. With one exception, we could not reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation. The exception was the model for total expenditure (te) whose residuals were serially correlated 
at the SBC selected lag orders of (1,1). We thus reestimated the model with lag orders (2, 2) to remove 
serial correlation. 
 
11 It should be pointed out that inferring a causal relationship and its direction from Wagner’s writings has 
been questioned by some authors. Peacock and Scott (2006, p. 9), for example, argue that “A more 
fundamental difficulty arises which is indicated by Wagner’s repeated emphasis on the modesty of his 
claims, remembering that he suggested an association between the growth of G and Y rather than some 
firm causation. In fact, at times he writes as if the chain of causation could be opposite by the authors, 
because a pre-requisite of economic growth must be growth in infrastructure.” See also footnote 7. 
 
12 See, for example, Worthingtion and Higgs (2003) for an application.   12
a.  Specify a VAR model in terms of the level of the variables and use a lag-order selection 
criterion to determine the optimal lag order (k). 
b.  Augment k, as determined before, by the maximal order of integration, dmax, in the system 
(usually 1 for most economic time series).  Then estimate a VAR(k +dmax) model using OLS.  
c.  Test zero parameter restrictions on the first k lags only in the VAR(k +dmax) model (ignoring 
the rest) using a Wald test.  This test statistic has an asymptotic 
2  distribution under the null 
hypothesis. The over-parameterized VAR ensures that the asymptotical critical values are 
applicable regardless of the integration properties of the variables in the system. 
For our purpose, the level VAR(k +dmax) for the jth spending category is written as 
follows: 
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where dmax=1 in both equations given that all the variables involved are all I(1). The null 
hypotheses tested are: (H0)5: j  s for the first k lags only are jointly equal to zero in Equation (5) 
and (H0)6: j  s for the first k lags only are jointly equal to zero in Equation (6). If we fail to reject 
(H0)5, then the Granger non-causality from pcpi to g j is rejected (stated differently, pcpi is said to 
Granger cause g j).  Similarly, the Granger non-causality from g j to pcpi is rejected if we fail to 
reject (H0)6.  
As shown in Table 5, there is evidence of a unidirectional causal relationship from pcpi to 
te, ed, ins and ssim. The variables pf, int and ut appear to be independent of pcpi.  Evidence 
supporting unidirectional causality from spending to pcpi is observed in relation to fagc only; 
although the evidence is relatively weak (the Chi-squared test p-value=0.08). Finally, the variable 
hy has a bidirectional causal relationship with pcpi based on the results of the Chi-squared test.   13
Accordingly, the causality direction from income to the relative size of public spending implied 
by Wagner’s Law  receives support in relation to SLG total expenditure and expenditures on 
education, social security and income maintenance (including public welfare and health and 
hospital), insurance benefits (including employment retirement), and highways. Interestingly 
enough, the aforementioned four income-driven expenditure sub-categories are the top four in 
Table 1 in terms of their relative size.  The causality direction from public expenditure to income 
emphasized by Keynesians is observed in relation highway and financial administration and 
general control expenditure sub-categories. As noted earlier, the statistical evidence in these cases 
is relatively weak and inconsistent.    
IV. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
  We investigated whether Wagner’s Law was supported by the U.S. state-local 
expenditure data (1957-2006) emphasizing various expenditure types and the concept of 
cointegration. Our informal analysis of the data indicated that the level of total expenditure and 
several of its sub-categories, particularly insurance trust benefits and social services and income 
maintenance grew at rates (significantly) above the rate of growth of aggregate state personal 
income on an inflation adjusted basis. This observation, which we interpreted as prima facie 
evidence supporting Wagner’s Law, is not surprising in view of a shift in public spending 
emphasis from the more traditional areas such as police and fire protection and highway to 
“social insurance” expenditures demanded by the electorate (Overbye, 1995) in more mature 
economies. What is perhaps surprising are the results of our formal analysis which indicated that, 
with the exception expenditures on insurance trust benefits and social services and income 
maintenance scaled by personal income (ins and ssim, respectively), no other nonstationary 
spending ratio was part of a cointegrating relationship with real per capita personal income (pcpi) 
as implied by Wagner’s Law. Other statistical evidence in favor of Wagner’s Law was fairly 
consistent in relation to these two sub-categories: Granger non-causality tests identified a causal 
ordering from pcpi to ins and ssim.  Moreover, both ins and ssim were income elastic.   14
The apparent long-term decoupling of some fast growing and nonstationary spending 
sub-categories (such as interest on debt and financial administration and general control) and pcpi 
is disconcerting, for pcpi is also an important indicator of fiscal capacity.  It lends credence to 
public anxiety about runaway government spending and higher attendant budget deficits and debt.  
From this perspective, the evidence suggesting that SLG total expenditure relative to personal 
income, while not cointegrated with pcpi, was stationary and ins and ssim, while nonstationary, 
error-corrected is somewhat reassuring. One may speculate that the error-correcting behavior of 
ssmi, at least to some extent, reflects the change in state funding responsibility for welfare 
spending subsequent to the welfare reforms introduced in 1996.  
  Research indicates that the U.S. states “public welfare” expenditures tend to change in 
countercyclical manner (Dye and McGuire, 2004). However, the finding that such expenditures 
relative to personal income can not deviate too much from their long-term relationship with pcpi 
suggests that the ability to increase them during the current economic downturn and falling 
income is somewhat limited.  If anything, spending cuts may be necessary especially in states 
with stringent balance budget rules. In this case, the discretionary “social services” component is 
likely to bear the brunt these cuts (Gais, 2009).  Thus, the injection of additional federal funds in 
the context of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 may be a welcome relief to 
many fiscally stressed state and local governments.   
 References 
Abizadeh, S., M. Yousefi (1992). “Wagner’s Law: New Evidence (Anthology).” Atlantic 
 Economic  Journal, June, 20, 2, p. 100 
 
Bird, R. M. (1971). “Wagner’s law’s of expanding state activity.” Public Finance, 26, 1- 26. 
 
Daly, Mary. (2003). “Understanding State Budget Troubles.” FRBSF Economic Letter, The  
  Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, August 15.. 
 
Dickey, D.A. and W.A. Fuller (1979). “Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time 
  Series with a Unit Root.” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74, 427–431. 
 
Dye, Richard F. and Therese J. McGuire. (2004). “State Fiscal Systems and Business Cycles:   
Implications for State Welfare Spending When the Next Recession Occurs.” Assessing  
the New Federalism; An Urban Institute Program to Assess Changing Social Policies 
99–4. 
 
Eberts, Randall W. and Timothy J. Gronberg (1992). “Wagner’s Hypothesis: A Local 
  Perspective.” Working paper 9202. The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. 
 
Engle, R. F. and C.W.J. Granger (1987). “Cointegration and error correction: representation, 
  estimation, and testing.” Econometrica, 55, 251-76. 
 
Gais, Thomas. (2009). “Stretched Net: The Retrenchment of State and Local Social Welfare 
 Spending Before the Recession.”  Publius:TheJournal of Federalism, 39 (3), 557-79. 
 
Garand, James C. (1998). “Explaining Government Growth in the U.S. States.” American 
 Political Science Review, 82 (3). 
 
Granger, C. W. J. and Newbold, P. (1974). “Spurious Regressions in Econometrics.”Journal of 
 Econometrics, 2, 111- 20. 
 
Henrekson, M. (1993). “Wagner’s Law: A Spurious Relationship?” Public Finance, 48(3), 406- 
 15. 
 
Islam, Anisul M. (2001). “Wagner’s Law Revisited: Cointegration and Exogeneity Tests for the 
 USA.”  Applied Economics, 8, 509-515. 
 
Johansen, Søren and Katarina Juselius (1990). “Maximum Likelihood Estimation and Inferences 
  on Cointegration—with applications to the demand for money.” Oxford Bulletin of 
 Economics  and    Statistics, 52, 169–210. 
 
Johansen, Søren, (1991). “Estimation and hypothesis testing of cointegration vectors in Gaussian 
 vector  autoregressive  models.”  Econometrica, 59, 1551-1580.  
 
Kwiatkowski, Denis, Peter C. B. Phillips, Peter Schmidt & Yongcheol Shin (1992). “Testing the 
  Null Hypothesis of Stationary against the Alternative of a Unit Root.” Journal of 
 Econometrics, 54, 159-178. 
 
   16
MacKinnon, James G. (1996). “Numerical distribution functions for unit root and cointegration 
 tests.”  Journal of Applied Econometrics, 11, 601–618 
 
MacKinnon, James G., Alfred A. Haug, and Leo Michelis (1999). “Numerical Distribution 
  Functions of Likelihood Ratio Tests for Cointegration.” Journal of Applied 
 Econometrics, 14, 563-577. 
 
Musgrave, R. A. (1969). Fiscal Systems, Yale University Press, New Haven and London. 
 
Narayan, P.K. (2005). “The Saving and Investment Nexus for China: Evidence from 
 Cointegration  Tests.” Applied Economics, 2005, 37, 1979–1990. 
 
Overbye, Einar. (1995). “Explaining welfare spending.” Public Choice, 85, 313-35. 
 
Payne James E., Bradley T. Ewing and Hassan Mohammadi (2006). “Wagner’s Hypothesis: New 
  Evidence from Using the Bounds Testing Approach,” in The Elgar Companion to 
  Public Economics, Attiat F. Ott and Richard J. Cebula (eds.) Edgar Elgar. 
 
Peacock, Alan and Alex Scott (2000). “The Curious Attraction of Wagner’s Law.” Public Choice, 
 102,  1-17.   
 
Peacock, Alan (2006). “Wagner’s Law of Increasing Expansion of Public Activities,” in The 
  Elgar Companion to Public Economics, Attiat Ott and Richard J. Cebula (eds.) Edgar 
 Elgar. 
 
Pesaran, M.H., Y. Shin and S. Smith (2001). “Bounds Testing Approach to the Analysis of 
 Level    Relationships.”  Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 16, 289-326.  
 
Phillips, P.C.B. and P. Perron (1988). “Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series Regression.” 
  Biometrika, 75, 335–346. 
 
Toda, H. Y. and Yamamoto, T. (1995). “Statistical Inference in Vector Autoregressions with 
 Possibly of Integrated Process.” Journal of Econometrics, 66, 225-250.  
 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2004). “Spending on Social Welfare Programs  
  in Rich and Poor States.” http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/social-welfare-spending04/report.pdf 
 
Wagner, A. (1893) Grundlegung der politischen Okonomi 
 
Worthington, Andrew C. and Helen Higgs (2003). “Art as an investment: Short and long-term 
comovements in major painting markets.” Empirical Economics, 28:649–668   17
Table 1.  Changes in US Total State-Local Expenditure, Expenditure Categories and Personal Income (constant dollars, 1957-2006)       
   1957  1957  1957  2006  2006  2006  Average annual  
Expenditure  












growth rate        
(1957-2006) 
Total expenditure (TE)  339,980,975 100  19.06  1,957,132,296  100  20.80  3.56 
  Police and fire protection-direct (PF) 16,290,634  4.79  0.91  88,394,014 4.52  0.94  3.44 
  Education-direct (ED)  101,052,363 29.72  5.66  568,280,396  29.04  6.04  3.51 
  Utility (UT)  24,981,483  7.35  1.40 132,279,964  6.76  1.41  3.39 
  Insurance trust benefits (INS)  19,655,058 5.78  1.10 159,218,007 8.14  1.69  4.27 
           Unemployment compensation (UC)  10,720,834  3.15  0.60 21,933,902  1.12  0.23  1.44 
                   Employment retirement (ER)  6,739,901  1.93 0.38  121,919,986  6.23  1.30  5.96 
  Social services and income maintenance(SSIM) 47,439,501  13.95  2.66 430,827,460  22.01  4.58  4.51 
                    Public welfare-direct (PW)  24,333,738  7.16 1.36  289,090,791  14.77  3.07  5.07 
Health and hospital-direct (HH)  22,882,391 6.73  1.28 141,736,669 7.24  1.51  3.71 
  Highway-direct (HY)  55,882,484  16.44 3.13  105,707,826  5.40  1.12  1.28 
  Financial admin. and general control (FAGC) 12,335,919  3.63  0.69  77,463,946 3.96  0.82  3.74 
  Interest on general debt (INT)  7,904,426 2.32  0.44  66,869,852 3.42  0.71  4.36 
Personal income (PI)  1,783,884,288        9,409,007,000        3.38 
Notes:             
Percents do not add up to 100, because not all expenditure categories are presented.           
Real expenditure and personal income figures were calculated using the state and local government consumption and investment spending deflator 
and U.S. GDP deflator, respectively.    
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Table 2.  Unit Root Test Results                    
     ADF test (H0:Unit Root)     PP test (H0: Unit Root)    KPSS test (Ho: No Unit Root)   Level (non)stationary
d 
Variable 
a   t-statistic  P-value 
b   Adj.  t-statistic  P-value 
b   LM-Statistic 
c    
ln(pcpi)                 
{1, C, T}    -1.318  0.872  -1.533  0.805   0.195**  Nonstationary 
{1, C, .}    -1.751  0.400  -1.186  0.673   0.931***   
ln(te)                  
{1, C, T}    -3.399 0.063   -3.736  0.029   0.067  Stationary 
{1, C, .}    -3.417 0.015   -3.944  0.004    0.139   
ln(ed)                 
{1, C, T}    -2.102  0.532  -3.131  0.111   0.104  Inconclusive 
{0, C, .}    -1.776  0.388  -2.072  0.257   0.340   
ln(fagc)                 
{0, C, T}    -0.136  0.993  -0.676  0.969   0.192**  Nonstationary 
{0, C, .}    -1.247  0.647  -1.075  0.719   0.899***   
ln(ins)                 
{0, C, T}    -3.097  0.118   -3.360  0.069   0.068  Inconclusive 
{1, C, .}    -2.863 0.057   -3.038  0.038    0.493**   
ln(int)                  
{1, C, T}    -3.438 0.058   -3.375  0.067    0.080  Inconclusive 
{1, C, .}    -0.262  0.923   0.495  0.985   0.886   
ln(pf)                 
{1, C, T}    -2.977  0.149  -2.921  0.165   0.059  Inconclusive 
{1, C, .}    -3.011 0.041   -2.996  0.042    0.063   
ln(ssim)                 
{1, C, T}    -3.044  0.132  -2.254  0.450   0.076  Nonstationary 
{1, C, .}    -1.566  0.492  -1.714  0.418   0.803***   
ln(hy)                 
{2, C, T}    -0.546  0.978  -1.065  0.925   0.213**  Nonstationary 
{2, C, .}    -2.137  0.232  -0.994  0.749   0.861***   
ln(ut)                  
{0, C, T}    -1.299  0.877  -1.522  0.808   0.116  Inconclusive 
{0, C, .}    -1.369  0.590  -1.549  0.501   0.281   
                  
                 
                 
                             
Note:                 
Bold face test values indicate evidence in favor of the existence of a unit root in the series. 
All variables are first-difference stationary or I(1). Results not reported. 
a. {L,C,T} represents the specification of the ADF unit root test equation. L denotes the optimal lag length selected by the 
Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBC) with a maximum lag length of 5.  C and T indicate the presence of a constant 
and a trend term, respectively, in the three unit root tests.   
b. MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.              
c.  Critical values for the LM statistic are from Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1)    
 
        
***,** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.     
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Table 3: Johansen Cointegration Test Results                         










Elasticity of Spending 
Error-
correction  
No. of cointegration, r  Eigenvalue  Statistic (5  percent)  Prob.†  Statistic  (5 percent)  Prob.†  at 5%   (SE)‡ 
Coefficient 
(SE)  
 ln(ed) and  ln(pcpi)                   
None 0.134  8.165  15.495  0.448  6.930 14.265  0.498  0  -0.303   
At most 1  0.025  1.235  3.841  0.266 1.235  3.841  0.266    (0.112)   
 ln(ins) and  ln(pcpi                   
None§ 0.439  31.462  15.495  0.001 27.78  14.265  0.002  1 0.169  -0.433 
At most 1  0.074  3.683  3.841 0.055  3.683  3.841 0.055  (0.086)  (0.078) 
 ln(fagc) and  ln(pcpi)                   
None 0.108    8.041  15.495  0.461  5.480 14.265  0.608  0  -1.525   
At most 1  0.052  2.561  3.841  0.109 2.561  3.841  0.109    (0.144)   
 ln(int) and  ln(pcpi)                   
None 0.189  11.020  15.495  0.210  10.064 14.265 0.208 0  -1.415   
At most 1  0.020  0.956  3.841  0.328 0.956  3.841  0.328    (0.133)   
 ln(pf) and  ln(pcpi)                   
None 0.203  13.491  15.495  0.098  10.862 14.265 0.161 0  -0.0300   
At most 1  0.053  2.628  3.841  0.105 2.628  3.841  0.105    (0.035)   
ln(ssim) and  ln(pcpi)                  
None §   0.313  21.537  15.495 0.005  18.007 14.265 0.012 1 0.425  -0.180 
At most 1  0.071  3.530  3.841 0.060  3.530  3.841 0.060   (0.058) (0.050) 
ln(hy) and  ln(pcpi)                  
None 0.079    6.637  15.495  0.620  3.951 14.265  0.864  0  -0.215   
At most 1  0.054  2.686   3.841  0.101 2.686    3.841  0.101    (0.471)   
 ln(ut) and  ln(pcpi)                  
None 0.077  6.228  15.495  0.669  3.863 14.265  0.874  0  3.575   
At most 1  0.048  2.365  3.841  0.124  2.365  3.841  0.124     (1.789)    
Notes:                    
In all cases, the cointegration analysis was based on the assumption of a linear deterministic trend in data, an intercept in the        
cointegrating equation and specification of first-difference lag interval of  (1, 1).       
§ Denotes rejection of the null at the 0.05 level.  
† MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999) p-values.       
 ‡Not strictly valid when r=0    
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Table 4.  Bounds Testing of Cointegration 
Variable Pairs 
Optimal Lag Length 
(m) 
N*R-
squared      Prob. Chi-squared  F(p,q)  Inference 
ln(te) and  ln(pcpi)   2, 2  2.32  0.31  CVL<4.26(2,40)<CVU Inconclusive 
          
ln(ed) and  ln(pcpi)   3, 3  3.74  0.15  3.99(2,37)< CVL 
No 
cointegration 
          
ln(ins) and  ln(pcpi)    1, 1  1.06  0.58  15.28(2,43)> CVU   Cointegration 
          
ln(fagc) and  ln(pcpi)    1, 1  2.24  0.33  CVL<4.47(2,43)<CVU Inconclusive 
          
ln(int) and  ln(pcpi)    1, 1  0.45  0.80  4.06(2,43)<CVL 
No 
cointegration 
          
ln(pf) and  ln(pcpi)  1,1 0.75  0.69  CVL<4.53(2,43)<CVU Inconclusive 
          
ln(ssim) and  ln(pcpi)    2, 2  2.76  0.25  5.63(2,40) > CVU   Cointegration 
          
ln(hy) and  ln(pcpi)    2, 2  0.74  0.69  3.39(2,40) < CVL  
No 
cointegration 
          
ln(ut) and  ln(pcpi)    1, 1  4.40  0.11  1.09(2,43)< CVL 
No 
cointegration 
                 
Notes:          
Optimal lag lengths (p)  were selected based on the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBC)   
N*R-squared is the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test statistic. The statistic has an asymptotic chi-square  
distribution under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.     
Small sample (N=50) lower bound (CVL) and upper bound (CVU) critical values at the five percent level are 4.07 and 5.19, 
respectively (Narayan, 2005, p.1988). 
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Table 5: Toda-Yamamoto Granger Non Causality Tests                   
Variable Pairs  Optimal VAR Lag Length (k)
a      F(k, l)
b  p-value 
 
p-value     Granger Causality Direction 
 
ln(te) and ln(pcpi)   2 3.03    (2,40)  0.060  6.63  0.036  
 
ln(pcpi)           ln(te)    
   1.57    (2,40)  0.220  3.56  0.169    ln(pcpi)      ←       ln(te) 
             
ln(ed) and ln(pcpi)   2 2.85  (2,40)  0.070  6.26  0.044   ln(pcpi)           ln(ed)    
   1.20  (2,40)  0.287  2.94  0.230    ln(pcpi)      ←       ln(ed) 
               
ln(fagc) and ln(pcpi)  2 0.160    (2,40)  0.853  0.37  0.830    ln(pcpi)      →      ln(fagc) 
   2.196    (2,40)  0.124  4.90  0.086   ln(pcpi)         ln(fagc) 
             




    0.325  (2,40)  0.724 0.758 0.684    ln(pcpi)     ←      ln(ins) 
             
ln(int) and ln(pcpi)  2  0.420  (2,40)  0.660 0.980 0.614    ln(pcpi)      →      ln(int)   
   1.32  (2,40)  0.279  3.00  0.223    ln(pcpi)      ←      ln(int) 
             
ln(pf) and ln(pcpi)   2  1.42 (2,40)  0.254       3.22  1.990    ln(pcpi)     →       ln(pf)   
   1.49  (2,40)  0.237  3.38  0.185    ln(pcpi)     ←       ln(pf) 
             
ln(ssim) and ln(pcpi)  2 3.30    (2,40)  0.047  7.18  0.028   ln(pcpi)          ln(ssim)   
    1.060  (2,40)  0.355 2.429 0.299    ln(pcpi)      ←      ln(ssim) 
             
ln(hy) and ln(pcpi)   3 2.22    (3,37)  0.102  7.62  0.054   ln(pcpi)          ln(hy)   
   1.91  (3,37)  0.144  6.63  0.085   ln(pcpi)         ln(hy) 
             
ln(ut) and ln(pcpi)   1  0.438    (1,43)  0.511 0.486 0.485    ln(pcpi)      →     ln(ut) 
    0.022    (1,43)  0.883 0.024 0.875    ln(pcpi)      ←     ln(ut) 
                     
 
Notes:  
a.  Selected based on the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBC). 
b. Test statistics correspond to the F-test of redundancy of the first k lags of the causal variable in Equations (5) and (6). 
c. Test statistics correspond to the log likelihood ratio test of redundancy of the first k lags of the causal variable in Equations (5) and (6). 
 indicates rejection of the non-causality null in the direction shown.  → indicates failure to reject the non-causality null in the direction shown. 
c
k ) (
2 